In June 2012, immediately after the Little Bear Fire burned outside Ruidoso, New Mexico, a team of researchers interviewed fi re managers, local personnel, and residents to understand perceptions of the event itself, communication, evacuation, and pre-fi re preparedness. Th e intensity of fi re behavior and resulting loss of 242 homes made this a complex fi re with a complex social response. While most of the people we spoke with thought the fi re was managed well despite diffi cult biophysical circumstances, some held the perspective that the fi re could have been extinguished sooner. One of the most agreed-upon successful aspects of the fi re was that everyone was evacuated with no injuries and no lives lost, despite the rapid fi re spread in an area with numerous houses and limited access. Notifying individuals of house loss and getting people back into their neighborhoods in a timely manner were the two issues most frequently identifi ed as areas needing improvement. Interagency and intra-agency communication were universally highly regarded by federal fi re personnel and local emergency responders. Th ese two groups also perceived communication with the public to have been successful. However, members of the public we spoke with thought there were some signifi cant communication issues and wanted certain information sooner and more frequently.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A research team of seven social scientists from North Carolina State University, the U.S. Forest Service, University of Colorado, and Ohio State University collected data from June 26 through June 30, 2012. Data were collected using structured interview protocols tailored for three stakeholder groups. Interviews were primarily conducted in person in Ruidoso and greater Lincoln County with teams of two (interviewer and note taker) and lasted from 45 minutes to 1.5 hours. Th e interviews were documented through extensive notes and digital recordings for later transcription; this report was generated from notes taken during the interview.
Th is research is part of a larger project to expand our understanding of social dynamics during and immediately after a wildfi re event. Th e focus is on perceptions of the event itself, communication, evacuation, and wildfi re preparedness among community members, local organizations, and federal agency personnel. To date, data collected after wildfi re events primarily focus on physical aspects of wildfi re behavior and impacts. Th is project seeks to develop a new framework for postfi re research that will: (1) facilitate more consistent and rigorous collection of social data immediately after an event, and (2) improve the ability to aggregate lessons across wildfi re events. Postfi re follow-up investigations can help clarify how the complex interactions between decisions made and actions taken before and during the fi re, by fi re and land managers and members of the public, contribute to better or worse outcomes. Th is project was funded by the National Fire Plan.
OVERVIEW
Th e Little Bear Fire was started by a lightning strike in the White Mountain Wilderness Area in south-central New Mexico on June 4, 2012; suppression activities were instigated by the Lincoln National Forest that afternoon. A preliminary fi reline had been completed around the fi re perimeter by the afternoon of the 8 th . However, later that day, high winds lifted fi re embers beyond the fi reline, leading to a fi re that burned a total of 44,330 acres (35,339 on Lincoln National Forest, 357 on Mescalero Tribal land, 112 on State of New Mexico land, and 8,522 on private land), 242 houses, and 12 structures. Th e primary entities involved in responding to the fi re were the Type 1 incident management team (IMT), the local Type 3 IMT, the U.S. Forest Service, Lincoln County Sheriff 's Offi ce, Lincoln County Offi ce of Emergency Services, Village of Ruidoso, and the State of New Mexico (NM). Th e fi re was very complex in terms of fi re behavior and response coordination. Several contextual items are of note to facilitate understanding of this fi re:
• Fire behavior was extreme, with an unexpected run that quickly covered thousands of acres and burned down hundreds of houses.
• Although the fi re aff ected public and private land in Lincoln County, its proximity to the Village of Ruidoso (hereafter Ruidoso) led to signifi cant concern about possible outcomes if the fi re entered Ruidoso.
• Communication was severely disrupted during the initial period of extreme fi re activity when the fi re burned through major communication lines. All Internet, land lines, and Verizon cell phones within 30 miles of the fi re area were shut down for several hours on the morning of June 9. Th is disruption was seen by many as having contributed to the proliferation of rumors on the fi re, which created management and communication challenges.
• Th ere was strong political interest in the fi re due to the number of homes lost, size of the fi re, and previous tensions over pre-fi re forest management.
A total of 30 interviews with 33 people were conducted from June 26 through June 30, 2012. Eleven interviews were conducted with primary responders (fi re and emergency personnel working out of the incident command post [ICP] ), 8 were conducted with local supporting personnel (e.g., Red Cross, Humane Society, Ruidoso employees), and 11 were conducted with households aff ected by the fi re (divided into three sub-groups: nonevacuated, evacuated with no losses, and evacuated with losses).
1 Th e impressions and recollections of the primary responders were remarkably consistent. While some off ered diff erent perspectives based on their own personal experiences, the diff erent perspectives served to off er a more comprehensive story, rather than presenting completely diff erent versions of the same set of events. Similarly, the perspectives of the local supporting personnel and residents were also largely consistent, although there were some diff erences depending on individual experiences. Th ere were some inconsistencies when perspectives were compared between groups; where applicable these inconsistencies are discussed below.
FIRE TIMELINE
Th e Little Bear Fire was ignited by lightning on Monday, June 4, 2012 in the White Mountain Wilderness Area on the Lincoln National Forest (outside of Ruidoso, NM). As soon as the detection was reported (afternoon of June 4), the Fire Management Offi cer (FMO) for the Smokey Bear Ranger District sent a helicopter to investigate. At that time the fi re was 0.5 acres and the helicopter crew requested permission to land and begin suppression using chainsaws in the Wilderness area. Permission was granted from the Forest Supervisor and the crew began creating a fi reline. Th is work continued until nightfall and the crew spent the night in a safe zone near the fi reline. Th e next morning (Tuesday the 5 th ) a Hotshot crew hiked to the fi re and took over suppression activities. Full suppression tactics were used; however, conditions were diffi cult with steep terrain, numerous standing dead trees (snags), and heavy fuels. Nevertheless, fi re crews made good progress and there was little concern about explosive growth. Th e incident was documented in the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) on Wednesday (6 th ) to document and plan fi refi ghting strategies; with existing weather conditions and continued full suppression tactics, the fi re was projected to be contained within a week. On Th ursday (7 th ), the District Ranger and FMO hiked out to the fi reline to check on progress and conditions. Fire crews were still making progress and there was little reason for concern. Air resources were attempted, but the thick canopy and steep terrain limited their utility.
By early afternoon on June 8 (Friday) the fi re was considered contained 2 as crews had completed a preliminary fi reline around its perimeter. However, later that afternoon winds picked up and carried embers beyond the containment line. Air resources (tankers and retardant) were ordered but had limited eff ectiveness. A Type 3 IMT 3 was ordered around 1:30 p.m. and arrived at the fi re at approximately 3:00 p.m. County emergency managers and state forestry offi cials were invited to participate in the team in-briefi ng. Due to the fi re's increasing complexity, the decision was made to order a Type 2 team at around 6:30 p.m.; continuing escalation of fi re behavior and conditions led to the decision to order a Type 1 team at 8:00 p.m. By this point, winds had picked up to 40+ mph, resulting in extreme fi re behavior. Th e fi re was in the forest canopy and was making downhill runs; both nighttime fi re growth and downhill runs are unusual and are indicators of extreme conditions. Friday night (8 th ) through Saturday afternoon (9 th ) was an important time period in the fi re. Fire behavior continued to be extreme and the fi re grew exponentially, reaching 15,000 acres by the evening of June 9. Most of the 242 homes and 12 outbuildings that were lost in the Little Bear Fire were burned during this time.
Late Friday night and early Saturday morning the sheriff 's offi ce (with assistance from the State Highway Patrol, Ruidoso police, National Guard, and New Mexico Department of Game and Fish) evacuated numerous subdivisions threatened by the fast-moving fi re. Th ese communities were located outside Ruidoso along Highways 48 and 37. Although the fi re ultimately did not enter Ruidoso, there was substantial concern that it could and several areas in the town were placed under a pre-evacuation alert. Evacuation and preevacuation notices were sent out by the emergency notifi cation systems (Code Red in Lincoln County and Call Me Ruidoso in Ruidoso). In addition, law enforcement offi cers drove through the aff ected areas with fl ashing lights, sirens, and a public address system and, when possible, conducted door-to-door notifi cations. Given the rapid spread of the fi re many people had only a few hours between the pre-evacuation notice and the actual evacuation order. People who had not registered their cell phone number for emergency notifi cations received far less warning if they also did not have a land line (land lines are automatically registered). Residents were described by offi cials as generally responsive to evacuation orders. 4 If people chose not to evacuate, offi cers collected contact information so that they could check on them should their house burn down or if they were missing after the fi re. Forest Service rangers were also sent out to campgrounds and along trails to evacuate overnight recreationists. Staff ed roadblocks restricted entry into evacuated areas throughout the evacuation.
Local churches opened shelters Friday night and early Saturday morning; the Red Cross based out of Roswell, NM took over the shelter functions for most communities on Saturday (the church-run shelter in Capitan remained open because the highway between Capitan and the Red Cross shelter was closed for much of the evacuation). Th e shelters were reported to not be heavily utilized. Th e Red Cross also set up a registration system to help keep track of evacuated residents; people could sign up either in person or online. Th e Humane Society moved most of the animals previously under its care to foster families to accommodate evacuated pets; however, this animal shelter was also described as being underutilized.
Th roughout the day on June 9, members of the Type 1 team integrated with the Type 3 team and were formally in-briefed at 4:00 p.m. Th e Type 1 team assumed command of the fi re on Sunday, June 10 at 6:00 a.m., having received a delegation of authority from Lincoln National Forest, Bureau of Indian Aff airs, NM State Forestry, and Bureau of Land Management. An ICP was set up at the Sierra Vista Primary School in Ruidoso. Local law enforcement set up a separate ICP nearby. Th e Governor of New Mexico authorized deployment of approximately 200 National Guard troops to help evacuate residents, manage roadblocks, prevent looting in evacuated subdivisions, provide security at the ICP, and assist with air support.
After the Type 1 team assumed command, more resources were added, extreme fi re conditions began to abate, and by June 11 fi re spread had slowed. To determine when residents could return to their property, the sheriff 's offi ce representative and Type 1 Incident Commander (IC) met each morning to discuss which neighborhoods could be opened. Th e IC gave recommendations based on what was or was not ready, but it was ultimately up to the sheriff 's offi ce when to lift an evacuation order. Most people were allowed to return to their homes by Th ursday the 14 th . By June 19 the fi re was no longer spreading. On June 23 command of the fi re was returned to the Type 3 team.
COMMUNICATION
Th e Forest Service did not initiate extensive public outreach eff orts during the fi rst 4 days of the fi re as at that point it was relatively small and far from any structures. Once the fi re grew and threatened communities, standard communication procedures were implemented. Th ese eff orts were disrupted during a critical period of the fi re (morning of June 9), when the fi re burned through communication lines, shutting down all Internet, land lines, and Verizon cell phones within 30 miles of the fi re area. As a result, communication was severely disrupted until the afternoon of the 9 th , when Verizon established an emergency replacement line through the Mescalero Apache Reservation.
When the Type 1 IMT took over on the 10 th its communication specialists began to work to facilitate information fl ow both between fi re management agencies and with the public. During the fi re there were numerous opportunities for face-to-face communication among fi re personnel and other entities involved in the fi re response. Th e IMT's liaison offi cer facilitated a cooperators' meeting each morning at 10:00 a.m. that included fi re personnel, county emergency management, law enforcement, nongovernmental organizations, and a number of others engaged in the fi re response. Meetings consisted of fi re status updates, upcoming fi re suppression strategies, and planned activities of each cooperator (including what resources were available and needed to complete the activity). Th e meetings provided a forum for all entities to discuss responsibilities and coordinate responses where appropriate. In addition, local law enforcement representatives were stationed at the ICP to maintain open lines of communication, both so that law enforcement would have upto-date information on fi re operations and so that the IMT could glean local knowledge on locations and resources.
Approximately 30 public information offi cers (PIOs) were assigned to the fi re to facilitate communication with the public. Multiple methods were used to provide information including traplines 5 , social media, Inciweb, an information phone line, and daily public meetings. PIOs from diff erent agencies participated in a daily meeting to coordinate messages and discuss what kinds of questions they were getting from their constituencies. Ruidoso's PIO also played an active role in providing information to the public. She updated the Ruidoso Facebook page with current information (also used to quell rumors), and produced user-friendly updates twice daily that were distributed to local businesses, elected offi cials, and residents, as well as to pre-established media contacts. On Sunday (10 th ) Ruidoso set up a phone bank at the fi re station that was run by Forest Service PIOs and Village staff . Th is joint arrangement allowed Ruidoso staff to provide the incident PIOs, many of whom lacked familiarity with the area, with local knowledge regarding the fi re's status and progress.
Prior to lifting evacuation orders, the sheriff and county emergency managers tried to individually notify homeowners of damaged or destroyed homes. Th e county emergency and assessor's offi ces fi rst went through the neighborhoods and identifi ed burned homes, and then provided the resultant list to the sheriff 's offi ce to contact the owners. A center was also set up in Ruidoso where homeowners could go to fi nd out if their home had burned. Th e center was staff ed with deputies, county employees, and clergy.
Residents
Most residents interviewed were aware of the initial fi re that started on Monday, but were not concerned as it was in the backcountry and appeared to be under control. Most learned about the growing fi re potential on Friday (8 th ) afternoon from informal conversations and 5 A trapline is a set of public locations where fi re information is distributed every day. seeing smoke plumes. Many did not anticipate that the fi re would aff ect them given its location on Friday. Once aware of the increased fi re activity, people actively monitored the fi re's status, often by driving to a vantage point where they could actually see the fi re and by asking more informed friends, family, and colleagues (e.g., those associated with local fi re departments or government agencies) for current information.
As the fi re progressed, a clear desire of all the residents we spoke with was for information on the fi re's trajectory to assess how they or their friends and family might be aff ected. For evacuees, the dominant information needs shifted over time: fi rst they wanted to know where to go once evacuated, then what houses had been lost and when they could return to their neighborhood. Th roughout the fi re, all the residents we interviewed continued to seek information from a variety of sources. Residents often mentioned speaking with local contacts who they felt were better positioned to provide reliable information. Th e public meetings hosted by the IMT each evening were also generally seen as a good source of information. In particular several residents reported that the maps displayed at the meetings were especially helpful. Inciweb.com and LittleBearFire.Info 6 were two online resources frequently mentioned as being useful.
OUTCOMES: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES

Overall Fire Management
Among primary fi rst responders, overall management of the fi re was highly regarded, with the acknowledgment that fi re personnel did the best they could under diffi cult biophysical circumstances (e.g., drought, heat, wind, high fuels). With a few key exceptions, roles and responsibilities among the diff erent responding agencies were clear and everyone was seen to have played his or her part. Th e local fi re departments were involved in structure protection in the evacuated neighborhoods, federal fi re personnel were involved in wildfi re suppression, and law enforcement was managing evacuations and roadblocks with support from the National Guard.
Residents
Residents' views of the management of the fi re were more mixed with just under half of the residents interviewed off ering critiques. Th e most common comment in this regard was the perception that the fi re was not fought aggressively enough in its fi rst few days. For instance, three residents we spoke with reported hearing diff ering accounts of fi re management strategies, including the allegation that the Mescalero Hotshots had off ered their fi refi ghting services on the fi rst day but were turned away by the Forest Service. Another comment was that the fi re was intentionally allowed to burn in the Wilderness area to meet fuel management goals. Whether true or not, the perceptions were signifi cant to these participants because they felt that more aggressive early suppression eff orts could have prevented the losses suff ered by the community.
Challenges in Coordinating across Multiple Jurisdictions
An important feature of this fi re was its threat to numerous values on federal, county, tribal, and municipal lands. Th erefore, multiple entities were engaged in planning operations to protect values at risk within their jurisdiction. According to participants, this resulted in the ordering of (or plans to order) additional fi refi ghting resources by state and municipal agencies independent of the operations planning conducted by the IMTs. Two important incidents were repeatedly mentioned by participants involved in the fi re response:
(1) During the height of the fi re on June 9, Ruidoso independently ordered fi re protection equipment (dozers) to create a containment line around the town. Th is action was generally described by participants as Ruidoso emergency personnel feeling that they needed to do something to protect the community without fully understanding the fi re management system already in place. Since the fi re was an imminent threat to properties in Lincoln County, county and state offi cials were directly engaged with the Type 3 team, but Ruidoso was less integrated into the fi re response.
(2) On June 9 the New Mexico Governor ordered a second Type 1 IMT. Th is decision was made without consulting the existing Type 1 team, which learned of the order hours after it had taken command of the fi re.
Both actions raised signifi cant confusion and concerns, particularly for the Type 1 IMT, as independent and uncoordinated fi re management actions can contribute to problematic outcomes. Critical questions included: (1) how the dozer line proposed by Ruidoso would impact existing fi re operations, as well as likely costs to repair any damage such a line would create; and (2) what to do with the second Type 1 IMT given there were no additional resources being brought in and all existing resources were being managed by the current Type 1 IMT.
Once aware of these actions the IMT held meetings with key parties to get everyone back on the same page. Th e team provided more information about how the incident response system works and discussed the specifi c fi re management operations and strategies in place for protecting Ruidoso and other values at risk. Th ese meetings also provided local actors the opportunity to clarify their concerns with the IMT. As a result, several mid-course adjustments were made:
(1) Operations to put a dozer line around Ruidoso were suspended.
(2) A decision was made to stage the second Type 1 IMT in Albuquerque, NM so that the team would be readily available to assist if the fi re became a more imminent threat to Ruidoso. It was reported that after this incident the IMT and Governor had good communication and the Governor was widely credited by a range of interviewees for working hard to dispel rumors and support fi refi ghting eff orts.
In refl ecting on the independent ordering of dozers, participants emphasized a psychological mandate to act that all jurisdictions were experiencing in order to protect their community. While this incident was reported to have caused tension at the time, many participants who spoke of it described it ultimately as a success story in interjurisdictional cooperation. Once parties could sit down together and talk through what they wanted and needed, a longer-term plan for protective actions was developed that could be implemented over the next year; energy that had been focused on immediate action was redirected to address future needs. Perspectives on whether this incident will have lasting positive or negative impacts on professional relationships were mixed. Some people reported that Ruidoso's independent actions refl ected a lack of trust and a breakdown in the type of communication which federal and local personnel had trained and planned for in the event of a wildfi re or other emergency. Others felt the experience solidifi ed relationships by clarifying who can do what, when, and demonstrating they were able to successfully work together through a very diffi cult situation.
Communication
Th e loss of communication lines on the 9 th created a major disruption that inhibited communication between all parties, but particularly with and between members of the public. Once the communication infrastructure was repaired, information was more readily available. However, by this time, many inaccurate stories about the fi re had developed and the PIOs had to play catch-up to correct rumors and misinformation.
Communication among Emergency Responders
Communication between these entities was largely considered to be good, with the exception of issues around roadblocks and reentry (see below). Even though the fi re burned through the region's primary communication line, fi re personnel had trained for communicating without cell phones during a fi re. So while their communications were hindered, they were able to use the radio and talk face-to-face to each other with little disruption to fi re management. Previous relationships between the Forest Service and other local emergency responders on the Little Bear Fire were largely credited with an integrated, open response. Th is perspective seems to hold true for people who were working at and through the ICP, or who participated in the cooperators' meetings. In addition, members of the Type 1 IMT had been working together for approximately 10 years, giving them a great deal of experience working with each other and developing a framework for eff ective communication with others engaged in fi re response.
Communication with the Public
Except for when the communication lines went down, the Forest Service and IMT personnel felt that communicating with and providing information to the public generally went well. However, several issues were identifi ed with getting information to the public:
• Th ere were no contingency plans to get information to the public when standard methods were unavailable. While the communication lines were down it was diffi cult to update Inciweb, send out press releases or social media updates, or answer phone inquiries.
• Public service announcements were broadcast on three local radio stations three times a day; however, radio reception was limited in some areas of the fi re. Local newspapers are published only twice a week and there are no local television stations, so these were not viewed as especially eff ective means of information sharing.
• It was announced that a public information line would be staff ed 24 hours a day, but the line was staff ed only from 6 a.m. to midnight.
• Th ere was some initial confusion during the fi re on where public information meetings would be held. Th is situation was later corrected.
• Lack of active outreach about the fi re before the blow-up was seen by some to have contributed to subsequent rumors and dissatisfaction with how the fi re was managed.
Several primary responders suggested that in the future contingency communication plans were needed for getting information to the public in a timely manner. Ideas included posting someone at the local radio stations to provide ongoing, accurate information and pre-identifying traplines for more effi cient information dispersal.
Resident Perceptions of Communication
Views of communication during the fi re were more mixed among the residents interviewed, with some providing positive views of communication eff orts and others feeling they were dismal. Overall most felt that communication during the initial blowup was poor, in large part due to communication equipment failures. Th is early loss of communication lines was particularly stressful for residents as it hindered ability to check on friends and family and locate each other during the height of fi re activity. However, many of those we spoke with found workarounds (e.g., sharing an AT&T cell phone and asking family outside of the area to tell them what was going on) to obtain the information they were looking for. Like agency personnel, a number of residents felt that the communication equipment failure contributed to the large number of rumors about management of the fi re. Most residents gave higher ratings for the latter portion of the fi re with some specifi c exceptions. Th e most common communication-related criticisms were as follows:
(1) Th e available mass media did not provide fi re updates frequently enough. Television and newspapers were generally seen as inadequate sources of information, either due to timeliness (frequency of the local newspapers), lack of local specifi city, or sensationalism (particularly in the national news). Local radio stations were cited by a few residents as a good source of timely information, but others thought that the information was not updated frequently or consistently enough. Several participants expressed the desire for a single dependable information source they could turn to in an emergency such as an emergency alert station, a specifi c radio station which would shift from the regular format, or a phone number that would have a continuous loop of information updated on a regular basis. Even if there was no change in the information participants indicated it would be helpful to know that it was the most current available, or know when an update would be available.
(2) Several people expressed frustration and confusion over the term "containment," which they believed indicated the fi re was out; when the fi re later blew up they were caught off guard and felt that they had been misled. Th is perception contributed to mistrust of explanations of management actions throughout the fi re.
(3) Resident participants expressed considerable frustration with the timeliness and accuracy of information on structural damage and losses. Th ey were upset with both the reported house loss estimates (which they thought were too low based on what they were seeing) and how long it took to formally provide specifi cs about home losses. Evacuees described the most stressful part of the fi re as "just not knowing" whether they had a house to return to. 7 Individuals needed to know, one way or the other, the status of their home so they could plan accordingly and begin moving forward.
Th e frustration associated with a lack of timely notifi cation was recognized by offi cials. One offi cial said: "I think it was very frustrating for people to go a week or 5 days not knowing whether their house survived, not knowing what they needed to do to plan if their house had been destroyed." Several factors contributed to the time it took to provide information on house loss. Offi cials with the Lincoln County Offi ce of Emergency Services and the Sheriff 's Offi ce felt it was important to personally notify owners of losses before the neighborhoods were re-opened to residents. However, prior to notifi cation all the properties had to be identifi ed and contact information for the owners had to be tracked down. Many of the houses were seasonal or vacation homes owned by people out-of-area and contact information was not always readily available. In addition, if individuals did not have a cell phone, fi nding a contact phone number for individuals not at their property was a challenge.
By the time the sheriff 's offi ce had cross-referenced the burned property with owner contact information and reached the owner, the vast majority of people already knew they had lost their house. Resident participants primarily mentioned two informal methods of learning the status of their home: sneaking back in to evacuated areas to check on their and their neighbors' homes, and contacting friends, family, or acquaintances who had access to the evacuation zone and could check on the status for them. Th is informal learning of the status of structural losses also allowed residents to compare the low offi cially reported losses to the much greater scale of losses they were learning had actually occurred (offi cial tallies included losses only as they were verifi ed). For some residents this discrepancy led to a general distrust in information they were being given from offi cial sources.
Evacuation
Th e perspective of all interviewees, agency and resident, was that the evacuation itself was very well executed. Th at there were no lives lost or major injuries was seen as notable, particularly given the speed of the fi re and the limited access to many evacuated areas, often on twisty, narrow roads. Th e timely notifi cations (both by phone and door-to-door visits by emergency personnel) were noted by a majority of participants as key reasons for the successful evacuation.
All but one household interviewed in the evacuation zone spoke of getting at least one, and sometimes two, pre-evacuation phone calls through the emergency notifi cation system and a fi nal call that it was time to leave. Most participants indicated that the preevacuation call gave them several hours to prepare, while a few indicated that they were woken from their sleep and had little time to get out. Most of those in an evacuation area also reported having at least one visit by a sheriff 's deputy. However, some people were missed; the one couple that reported not receiving outside evacuation warnings ended up losing their house, indicating that despite being in the evacuation zone they did not learn of the evacuation from offi cial sources. In most cases the sheriff 's deputy knocking on the door or the phone call saying it was time to leave was the point where individuals decided to evacuate. Several reported leaving because of the amount of ash that was falling around their house. We spoke with one person in a pre-evacuation area who also chose to evacuate, out of concern for her pet. And one couple in an evacuation area reported that the wife left but the husband stayed, as did their son, who lived in a nearby house.
Shelters
Several resident interviewees expressed frustration at not knowing where to go once they had evacuated and at how diffi cult it was to fi nd this information. Th e fi rst night in particular was problematic. Agency personnel recognized that there was some confusion regarding the location of shelters as some residents were directed to area churches that were not, in fact, open as shelters. Th is confusion was attributed to out-of-date information on shelters being used in emergency notifi cations.
Ultimately, none of our participants stayed at a shelter. Instead, those who evacuated stayed either in hotels, with friends or relatives, in an RV, or in seasonal homes volunteered by out-of-area owners. For the majority of the evacuees we spoke with, a major concern when evacuating was animals, from household pets to livestock. For several residents, having animals also caused complications in fi nding a place to stay. One resident reported that she, her mother, and their dogs stayed the fi rst night at a relative's house. However, as the house was really too small to accommodate all the evacuees, they spent the second night in their car before getting permission to use the trailer of a seasonal resident for the remainder of the evacuation. For its part, the Humane Society mobilized to make space for evacuated pets. However, due to some misinformation reported to the public concerning the available capacity of the shelter for housing evacuated animals, the shelter was not utilized as much as expected.
Roadblocks and Access
Roadblocks were an area where all groups interviewed raised concerns. Although law enforcement cannot legally force people to leave their properties in New Mexico, once people leave they can be prevented from returning for the duration of the evacuation order. To allow fi refi ghters to safely complete mop-up, prevent a second evacuation should the fi re pick back up, and complete damage assessments, most areas were evacuated for almost a week. Th is was seen as longer than necessary by some members of the public. Once the immediate fi re danger had passed there were reports of people who wanted access to their homes running the roadblocks and receiving citations. Residents who needed to feed pets or pick up medication were escorted in and out of the evacuation zone, when possible. From law enforcement's perspective managing the roadblocks went relatively well, given the circumstances. Th e residents we spoke with, however, reported a wider range of experiences with roadblocks. Some reported courteous interactions at roadblocks, some felt their concerns were treated too cavalierly, and others were quite frustrated by their interactions. Some people who were refused entrance at the roadblock reported using off -road equipment to bypass the roadblocks and check their property.
Participants in all three stakeholder groups mentioned that some people staffi ng the roadblocks lacked updated information on who should have access to the evacuation zone. Given the large area evacuated, number of roadblocks (eight), and number of agencies helping the sheriff 's offi ce staff the roadblocks (often from outside the area), keeping everyone updated was a challenge. Some of the problem was technology related. For example, when the National Guard soldiers arrived they did not have radios, so the local law enforcement had to get radios for them (which was accomplished fairly quickly). Most people we spoke with noted the inherent challenges with keeping everyone updated and thought that overall the roadblocks were successful. However, they lamented the consequences of failed communication. For instance, some utility workers were denied access to neighborhoods when they were trying to check on infrastructure, which delayed reopening of the neighborhood (see Reentry below).
Reentry
A number of participants spoke of signifi cant frustration within the community with how long it took for the evacuation orders to be lifted. Emergency responders we spoke with described several factors that contributed to how long it took. Before lifting the evacuation order, the sheriff 's offi ce consulted with fi re personnel about the likelihood the neighborhood would need to be re-evacuated and about the safety concerns related to power and gas lines, propane tanks, hazard trees, and embers or smoldering areas.
Assessing these factors took longer than anticipated; the overarching explanation given by fi re and emergency personnel was that there was not a comprehensive plan for reentry. Consequently decisions were made independently and things took place haphazardly. For instance, each of the separate utility companies needed access to the restricted areas, but sometimes they were not allowed through roadblocks (some arrived in unmarked vans; other times the person managing the roadblock didn't know the utility representatives should have access) and there was no central location or mechanism set up to share their fi ndings and expedite reentry. In addition, several actions had to be taken before a neighborhood could be opened back up. For example, once the gas company goes in and re-pressurizes the lines, there is a 24-hour wait period to make sure there are no leaks. But this type of information was not well communicated to the public. Improvements in this regard were actively underway at the time of our interviews. Th e IC mentioned his team was drafting a one-page list of conditions to consider when deciding whether to open an area up that could be shared with the public and sheriff . In addition, Lincoln County was working on a comprehensive reentry plan (including homeowner notifi cation) in consultation with a Type 3 IMT from Texas that was brought in to assist with recovery.
Integration of Volunteer Organizations at Disasters (VOADS)
Two positive outcomes from the Little Bear Fire frequently noted by residents and members of local organizations were: (1) the community cohesion exhibited during the fi re, and (2) the helping behavior exhibited by both community members and those outside the community during and after the fi re. Local community organizations (e.g., churches, Humane Society, Red Cross) can play key support functions during disasters such as providing food and shelter for humans and animals, and helping people to cope with losses. Th ese organizations are collectively known as Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters, or VOADs. However, our interviews suggest that coordinating this work can be a challenge and we heard of several issues that arose. Most of them were related to the poor integration of VOADs into the emergency responder system despite their integral role in community response and recovery. During the Little Bear Fire several organizations faced obstacles that were perceived as undermining their ability to work eff ectively to support the community. Some identifi ed issues were as follows:
• Uncoordinated self-deployment of VOADs early in the fi re added to the confusion of a very complex fi re event. Although VOADs had sponsored a training event that provided opportunities to interact with county and sheriff 's deputies, these relationships were still relatively new.
• Th ere were challenges with coordinating the large number of individuals and groups interested in assisting.
• Closure of a primary transportation corridor (Highway 48) created logistical challenges with coordinating informational meetings and work at shelters in Capitan and in Ruidoso. Once the highway was opened it was easier for groups to coordinate eff orts and pool resources.
• Several key actors were new to their roles or were based outside the immediate area and had yet to develop trust and good relationships locally. For VOADs based outside the community, community distrust of outsiders meant that organizations without a strong local contact faced additional obstacles. Th ere was also a sense that organizations from outside the area were not suffi ciently aware of local resources and capacity.
Preparedness/Mitigation
Perceptions of Emergency Responder Preparations
Participants from responding agencies reported that there were multiple ongoing eff orts in Ruidoso to help agencies prepare for working together during an incident like the Little Bear Fire. 
Perceptions of Community Preparations
While the fi re burned public and county lands, local wildfi re capacity had been developed primarily within Ruidoso (in terms of mitigation, preparedness, and response capacity) rather than in the county. Lincoln County covers a broad area (4,831 square miles) and has limited staff to coordinate its management compared to the more compact and well-staff ed Village of Ruidoso. For example, the county had a new PIO whose limited time in the position meant that relationships and communication networks had yet to be developed. Diff erences were also mentioned in terms of residents' level of preparedness; several county residents interviewed indicated that it would be good for the county to have defensible space requirements similar to those in Ruidoso (the town has requirements for completing defensible space activities and a weekly disposal service for yard debris). Th at is not to say that the county was completely unprepared. Th e county had recently developed a community wildfi re protection plan (CWPP) which was credited with helping the community prepare. In addition, the seven volunteer fi re departments in the county participate in a wildland fi re academy to receive training and information that can be passed to members of their communities. Some of these departments have received money from the state to update equipment and prepare for wildfi re.
Multiple research participants in all stakeholder groups mentioned that Ruidoso and the surrounding area is largely a resort community. For both agency personnel and residents the main issue identifi ed with being a resort community was that some part-time residents seemed less aware of wildfi re risk and were less likely to engage in defensible space activities. As such, the conditions on parcels owned by part-time residents were thought to make neighboring properties more vulnerable. On the fl ip side, an indirect benefi t of the presence of many absentee and part-time owners was that some of these owners volunteered use of their home to evacuees during the fi re event and, in some cases, during the rebuilding of burned homes.
Residents
All interviewed residents were very aware of the fi re risk and had taken basic actions on their property to mitigate the risk such as trimming vegetation and raking up pine needles. In some cases the actions taken were quite extensive including signifi cant thinning of large areas and designing a new house with fi re in mind. Despite this preparation, more than half of respondents indicated that while they weren't surprised the fi re happened, they were surprised that it actually aff ected them: "I guess we thought it would not happen to us." Th e primary impact of experiencing a fi re on residents' future preparedness plans was in terms of evacuation planning. Even though a fair number of residents had had some level of plan for what they would do and what they would take, many of them identifi ed additional actions they could take, such as having a large bag handy to throw everything into. A few also indicated they were looking more closely at their insurance policies. Many residents expressed concern that the fi re would lead to fl ooding. Several had engaged in mitigation actions, including acquiring sand bags and digging trenches around their homes.
Pre-fi re Forest Management Concerns
A majority of residents interviewed felt that poor forest management before the fi re contributed to the extreme behavior of the Little Bear Fire. Some participants were upset over environmentalists' appeals on fuels reduction projects, while others felt lack of fuels treatments was due to budgetary or other agency constraints. Th e management of the adjacent Mescalero Apache Reservation land was brought up by several residents that we spoke with as an example of how Forest Service land should be managed. Th e thought was that if the forest in the Wilderness area had been thinned to look like the Tribal lands, which were easily visible along one of the local highways, then the fi re would not have threatened the community. Some of the local agency personnel interviewed recognized that this perception was held by some community members, but pointed out that people were comparing two diff erent forest types with diff erent fi re regimes and that diff erent management strategies were appropriate in each forest type. Local personnel also expressed frustration that members of the public did not seem to recognize the many fuels reduction projects that were implemented each year.
Th e critique that the destructiveness of the Little Bear Fire was attributable, at least in part, to ineff ective forest management practices was also expressed by a non-local elected offi cial and some media outlets. Th e fi re was used as an example of the need to change Forest Service policies, which had the eff ect of politicizing the fi re. Th is involvement was seen by many in the primary responder group as complicating management of the fi re by adding confusion and stirring negative emotions within the community, straining professional relationships, and encouraging local entities to take action independent of the IMT. As one person in the primary responder group put it, "Th is was a diffi cult fi re with all the politics…and emotions running high. Th ere were a lot of people who had worked together for a lot of years that were really upset with each other for a short period of time."
Th ese critiques, along with notions held by some community members that the fi re had intentionally not been fought aggressively during initial attack, personally aff ected several of the local fi re personnel that we spoke with. Th ey expressed dismay that people in the community believed that they would have purposely let the fi re get large and burn down homes. From their perspective they had done everything they could to eff ectively fi ght the fi re, beginning the moment the fi re was spotted. Th ey frequently spoke with emotion when they said that the Little Bear Fire personally aff ected them, too; it was also their homes and their community that burned.
Looking towards the future, two people in the primary responder group suggested the need for better preparations on the political and social side of wildfi re, particularly how to more eff ectively respond on a politicized fi re. One of these participants went further to suggest the Forest Service needs to do more outreach on what the Forest Service does, why it does the things it does, and being more explicit on what is and is not possible.
SUMMARY
Once the Little Bear Fire escaped the initial fi reline, it moved very quickly for 24-48 hours, during which time the fi re grew exponentially and burned hundreds of homes. Th e intensity of fi re behavior and resulting loss of homes made it a complex fi re. Social responses added to the complexity. While most of the people we spoke with thought the fi re was managed well despite diffi cult biophysical circumstances, some held the perspective that the fi re should have been extinguished sooner and that if more fuels treatments had been implemented before the fi re it would not have been as extreme. Th ese diff erent perspectives have resulted in some tensions within the community.
One of the most agreed-upon successful aspects of the fi re was that everyone was evacuated without injury or loss of life, despite the rapid fi re spread in an area with limited access. Notifying individuals of house loss and getting people back into their neighborhoods in a timely manner were the two areas most frequently identifi ed as needing improvement. Both issues had been recognized by the county and the IMT and development of plans to improve both notifi cation and reentry had already begun.
Th e independent ordering of fi re resources by diff erent entities was a major concern for many in the primary responder group. Th e ordering of additional resources took place during a period of extreme fi re behavior, when the communication lines were down, and the Type 1 team was still transitioning into command. Each of these factors, along with the practical need to do something, may have contributed to decisions to take independent action and highlights the challenges that are faced during initial periods of heightened fi re activity. However, two dynamics mentioned by multiple participants point to areas for possible improvement: (1) A number of individuals felt that a key underlying issue was lack of understanding of how the incident command system (ICS) works. Working to improve non-emergency responders' understanding of the ICS could potentially decrease the impetus for taking independent actions. It was also suggested that greater understanding by non-emergency responders would help integrate VOADs into community response. (2) A commonly expressed view was that the actions were taken out of a simple need to "do something" to protect one's community. Recognizing that people have this need highlights the importance of ensuring all parties aff ected, or potentially aff ected, by a fi re have a chance to discuss fi re management decisions and how they can best contribute.
Interagency and intra-agency communication were universally highly regarded within the primary responder and local responder groups. Th e daily cooperators' meetings were especially well received and thought to be successful. Th ese two groups also perceived communication with the public to have been successful. However, members of the public we spoke with thought there were some signifi cant communication issues and wanted certain information sooner and more frequently. Part of the problem was that the primary regional communication infrastructure was burned through during the height of the fi re and was out for several hours. Th e combination of a lack of initial information and disruption to communication capacity when the fi re blew up was identifi ed by participants as contributing to rumors and misunderstandings of fi re and forest management, and the public's feeling that it was not kept informed. Better advance planning for communication technology failures as well as more proactive outreach, both when a fi re is relatively non-threatening and in terms of explaining agency management actions, were suggestions of how to minimize such misunderstandings.
An additional area where communication attention may be needed to minimize misunderstandings is in relation to clarity of fi re terminology. While the term "containment" has a specifi c meaning within the fi re community, to some of the residents we spoke with it was taken as meaning there was no chance of further fi re growth; the fi re was essentially out. Th is confusion contributed to distrust of fi re management eff orts and suggests the need to better explain what the term means from a practical point of viewthat embers can travel beyond the fi reline-when using the term with the public.
